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Global Conventions on Maritime 
Crimes Involving Piratical Acts 
Captain J. Ashley Roach, JAGC, USN (retired)* 
This article examines how the 1979 International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the 1988 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) collectively fill many of 
the limitations in the provisions of the international treaties on 
piracy. Further, the 2005 SUA Protocol makes significant 
improvements to its predecessor. Used together, these 
instruments complement each other in the context of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. However, implementation through 
domestic legislation is essential to enabling nations to suppress 
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and are 
not intended to reflect the positions of any department or agency of the 
U.S. Government. This paper is adapted and updated from J. Ashley 
Roach, Global Conventions on Piracy, Ship Hijacking, Hostage Taking 
and Maritime Terrorism: Prospects for Cooperation, in PIRACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES IN ASEAN 38 (Robert C. Beckman & 
J. Ashley Roach eds., 2012). Captain J. Ashley Roach, JAGC, U.S. 
Navy (retired) was attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Department of State, from 1988 until he retired at the end of 
January 2009, responsible for law of the sea matters. He has taught, 
advised and published extensively on national maritime claims and 
other law of the sea issues, including piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
He has negotiated, and participated in the negotiation of, numerous 
international agreements involving law of the sea issues. He received his 
LL.M. (highest honors in public international law and comparative law) 
from the George Washington University School of Law in 1971 and his 
J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1963. 
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I.  Introduction 
This article analyzes three U.N. counter-terrorism conventions as 
potential tools to combat piracy and other serious international 
maritime crimes. Rather than create new legal instruments to address 
maritime piracy, these three conventions provide mechanisms to deal 
with ship-hijacking, the taking of crew members hostage for ransom, 
and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. 
Considered in the context of the twenty participants of the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct (“DCOC”),1 the three treaties are the 1979 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostage-
Taking Convention”),2 the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
 
1. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Adoption of the Code of Conduct Concerning 
the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1 
(Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/ 
PIU/Documents/Djibouti Code of Conduct%20English.pdf; Signatory 
States, IMO, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/ 
Signatory-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2013); infra Table 1. 
2. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered 
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Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“1988 SUA 
Convention”),3 and the Protocol of 2005 to the 1988 SUA Convention 
(“2005 SUA Protocol”).4 In addition to these three conventions, 
several other treaties may provide support in combating piracy and 
other serious international maritime crimes. These treaties are 
referenced throughout the article, and they are included in Table 2. 
The DCOC was formulated in response to the escalating incidents of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia. It calls for, inter alia, the promotion 
of greater regional cooperation among the participants as a means 
more effectively to prevent, prosecute, and punish those who commit 
piratical acts at sea.5 Given the commitments enshrined in the 
DCOC, the Djibouti participants should recognize the utility of these 
three conventions in achieving the goals set out therein. Therefore, 
after detailing the relevant provisions of the three treaties, this article 
proposes that the DCOC members should ratify these conventions 
and pass domestic legislation incorporating the substance of the 
treaties.  
A. Status of Conventions6 
The Hostage-Taking Convention currently has 173 parties, 
including nearly all of the participants in the DCOC except Eritrea, 
the Maldives, and Somalia.7 Of the participants in the DCOC,  
into force June 3, 1983) [hereinafter Hostage-Taking Convention], 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-5.pdf.  
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 
221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 1988 SUA 
Convention].  
4. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature 
Feb. 14, 2006, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force July 28, 
2010) [hereinafter 2005 SUA Protocol]. The consolidated text of the 
1988 SUA Convention as modified by the 2005 Protocol is available at 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/en/2005_Cons_Version_Conv_and_Prot
_Maritime_Navigation.html. This article does not address the 1988 and 
2005 Protocols for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf or the 2003 
Convention against Corruption.  
5. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 1, pmbl. 
6. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus. 
aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (noting the location where the status of 
treaties registered with the U.N. may be viewed).  
7. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no 
=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (describing 
the status of the parties and signatories to the Hostage-Taking 
Convention). 
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Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, 
South Africa, Sudan, UAE, and Tanzania have either existing 
domestic legislation dealing with the crime of hostage-taking, or they 
have enacted legislation implementing the Convention.8 
Similar in size, the 1988 SUA Convention currently has 163 
parties, including all of the participants in the DCOC except Eritrea 
and Somalia.9 Of the participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct, 
Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Maldives, Oman, South Africa, Sudan, 
UAE, Tanzania, and Yemen have either existing domestic legislation 
addressing maritime security, or they enacted legislation 
implementing the Convention.10 
The 2005 SUA Protocol is the smallest of the three conventions, 
with a current membership of 29 parties. None of the participants in 
the DCOC are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol except Saudi Arabia.11 
As discussed in the following sections, these three conventions can 
adequately provide a framework for combating piracy, which is the 
central goal of the DCOC. This brief status report suggests that there 
are several holes in the legal framework to diffuse the piracy situation 
off the coast of Somalia. The remainder of this article propounds that 
until all DCOC participants ratify and implement these important 
conventions, the DCOC objectives—namely, providing lasting 
solutions to maritime piracy—cannot be obtained. By building a 
complete foundation for legal accountability of pirates through these 
treaties, the DCOC countries would serve both their individual and 
collective self-interests.  
 
8. See generally Browse Countries, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/browse_countries.html (last visited Mar. 
14, 2013) (listing U.N. member states and linking to each state’s 
substantive criminal law implementing the Hostage-Taking Convention).  
9. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of 
Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General 
Performs Depository or Other Functions 418–19 (2014), 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Docume
nts/Status%20-%202014.pdf. 
10. See Browse Countries, supra note 8 (providing a link to each state’s 
substantive criminal law relating to maritime security); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Letter dated 23 March 2012 from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/177 (Mar. 23, 2012) (detailing the domestic enactment of 
anti-piracy criminal legislation and the prosecution efforts against 
pirates in forty-two U.N. member states); see generally National 
Legislation on Piracy, U.N. OCEANS AND LAW OF THE SEA, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/piracy/piracy_national_legislation.htm 
(last updated Oct. 26, 2011) (listing those states with implementing 
legislation on piracy in compliance with G.A. Res. 64/71).  
11. See IMO, supra note 9, at 430–31 (listing, inter alia, those states that 
are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol).  
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B. Criminal Jurisdiction at Sea Generally 
The existence and scope of criminal jurisdiction at sea is governed 
by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 
UNCLOS, who may exercise criminal jurisdiction at sea depends on 
the maritime location. Seaward of the territorial sea, the flag state has 
exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag.12 Except in cases of 
piracy or suspected statelessness,13 no foreign state may board another 
nation’s vessels or arrest persons on board without the vessel’s 
permission, granted ad hoc or in advance by international agreement. 
This rule was not changed by the 2005 SUA Protocol. 
In the territorial sea, generally speaking, no foreign vessel may be 
boarded without the coastal state’s permission. This is not always the 
case, as some coastal states also require the flag state’s permission to 
board.14 UNCLOS seeks to restrain the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by the coastal state on board a foreign ship in the 
territorial sea. Article 27 of UNCLOS allows such jurisdiction in only 
a few enumerated circumstances: 
1.  The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be 
exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the 
territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed on 
board the ship during its passage, save only in the 
following cases: 
(a)  if the consequences of the crime extend to the 
coastal State; 
(b)  if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the 
country or the good order of the territorial sea; 
(c)  if the assistance of the local authorities has been 
requested by the master of the ship or by a 
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; 
or 
(d)  if such measures are necessary for the suppression of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances. 
 
12. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 58(2), 92(1), opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (stating that flag states have exclusive 
jurisdiction over ships flying their flags in the high seas). All 
participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and the UAE are party. See infra Table 1.  
13. UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 105, 110, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437, 438. 
14. Id. art. 27, at 407. 
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2.  The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal 
State to take any steps authorized by its laws for the 
purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign 
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving 
internal waters. 
3.  In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
coastal State shall, if the master so requests, notify a 
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before 
taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such 
agent or officer and the ship’s crew. In cases of emergency 
this notification may be communicated while the measures 
are being taken. 
4.  In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should 
be made, the local authorities shall have due regard to the 
interests of navigation. 
5.  Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to 
violations of laws and regulations adopted in accordance 
with Part V, the coastal State may not take any steps on 
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to 
arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in 
connection with any crime committed before the ship 
entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a 
foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea 
without entering internal waters.15 
C. Obligations of State Parties 
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the two SUA Conventions 
each obligate state parties to take a number of actions to carry out 
the international obligations the parties undertook by ratifying or 
acceding to those treaties.  
First, state parties are required to make the offenses enumerated 
in the convention crimes under their national law punishable by 
“appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of 
those offenses.”16 These offenses are described in greater detail in the 
following section of this article. Next, state parties are required to 
 
15. Id. Article 27 is adapted from Article 19 of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Compare id. (stating 
UNCLOS’ treatment of coastal state criminal jurisdiction over foreign 
ships), with Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
art. 19, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 
U.N.T.S. 205 (specifying the Convention on the Territorial Sea’s 
treatment of coastal state criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships).  
16. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207; 
1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 5, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 226; 2005 
SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5.  
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establish jurisdiction over the offender: (a) if the offense occurred 
within its territory, including its territorial sea; (b) if it is the flag 
state; (c) if the offender is the state party’s national; or (d) if the 
offender is present in the state party’s territory.17 
Additionally, state parties are required, if the alleged offender is 
present in the state party’s territory, to take the individual into 
custody, and either seek to prosecute or extradite the individual.18 
Finally, state parties are required to provide the greatest measure of 
assistance in connection with the criminal proceedings. This may 
include supplying evidence in the case of the Hostage-Taking 
Convention or assistance in obtaining such evidence in the case of the 
SUA Convention, when the state parties have the information at their 
disposal.19 
II.  Offenses Under All Three Conventions Under 
Analysis 
A. Offenses Under the Hostage-Taking Convention 
Article 1 of the Hostage-Taking Convention defines the offense of 
hostage-taking as follows: 
1.  Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to 
injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter 
referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third 
party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental 
organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of 
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit 
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits 
the offence of taking hostages (“hostage-taking”) with the 
meaning of this Convention. 
2.  Any person who: 
 
17. See Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 
207–08; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 
226; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6(1). The SUA Conventions 
also permit a party to establish jurisdiction if a SUA offense (a) is 
committed by a stateless person habitually resident in that state, or 
(b) if one of its nationals is seized, threatened or killed, or (c) the 
offense is committed in an attempt to compel that state to do or abstain 
from doing any act. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(2), 1678 
U.N.T.S. at 226; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6(2). 
18. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, arts. 6(1), 8(1), 1316 
U.N.T.S. at 208–09; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, arts. 7(1), 
10(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 227–29; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 
7(1), 10(1).  
19. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(1), 1316 U.N.T.S. at 
210; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 12(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 
230; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 12(1).  
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(a)  Attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or 
(b)  Participates as an accomplice of anyone who 
commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-
taking likewise commits an offence for the purposes 
of this Convention.20 
Accordingly, the offense of hostage-taking involves three elements 
as defined by this convention. The offense of hostage-taking requires 
(1) an individual to detain a person, (2) in order to compel another to 
act or not act, (3) as a condition for release of the hostage. 
B. Offenses Under the 1988 SUA Convention 
Article 3 of the 1988 SUA Convention defines the following 
offenses: 
1.  Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully 
and intentionally: 
(a)  seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or 
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or 
(b)  performs an act of violence against a person on 
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship; or 
(c)  destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its 
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of that ship; or 
(d)  places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any 
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is 
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that 
ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
(e)  destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational 
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, 
if any such act is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of a ship; or 
(f)  communicates information which he knows to be 
false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a 
ship;21 or 
 
20. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207.  
21. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(f), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see 
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(2) (replacing 
subparagraph (f) with the following gender-neutral text: “communicates 
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(g)  injures or kills any person, in connection with the 
commission or the attempted commission of any of 
the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).22 
2.  Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
(a)  attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in 
paragraph 1; or 
(b)  abets the commission of any of the offences set forth 
in paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is 
otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits 
such an offence; or 
(c)  threatens, with or without a condition, as is 
provided for under national law, aimed at compelling 
a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from 
doing any act, to commit any of the offences set 
forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), 
if that threat is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the ship in question.23 
Thus, the scope of maritime offenses under the 1988 SUA 
Convention is broad—it covers nearly all acts of violence committed 
against ships, and also punishes those who attempt, abet, or threaten 
such violent acts.  
 
information which that person knows to be false, thereby endangering 
the safe navigation of a ship”).  
22. 1988 SUA Convention supra note 3, art. 3(g), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see 
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(3) (deleting 
subparagraph (g) from the 1988 SUA Convention). 
23. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see 
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(4) (replacing paragraph 2 
with the following text: “Any person also commits an offence if that 
person threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under 
national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or 
refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences set forth in 
paragraphs 1 (b), (c), and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the 
safe navigation of the ship in question.”); see also id. art. 4(7) (moving 
provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) on accessory offenses to Article 
3quater).  
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C. Offenses Under the 2005 SUA Protocol24 
Paragraphs 5-7 of Article 4 of the 2005 SUA Protocol expand the 
reach created by the 1988 SUA Convention by adding four new 
categories of offenses under the Convention. These new categories 
include using a ship in a terrorist offense; transporting a WMD, 
delivery systems, and related items; transporting a terrorist fugitive; 
and accessory offenses. 
1.  Counterterrorism offenses 
Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3bis(1)(a) to 
the 1988 SUA Convention, making it an offense for a person to 
unlawfully and intentionally, with the purpose of intimidating a 
population, or compelling a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any of these acts:  
(i)  use[] against or on a ship or discharge[] from a ship any 
explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon25 in a 
manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious 
injury or damage;  
(ii)  discharge[], from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other 
hazardous or noxious substance . . . in such a quantity or 
concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or 
serious injury or damage;  
(iii)  use[] a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury 
or damage; or (iv) threaten[] . . . to commit an offence set 
forth in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii), or (iii).26 
2.  Non-proliferation provisions 
Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol also adds 3bis(1)(b) to the 
1988 SUA Convention and makes it an offense to transport on board 
a ship: 
(i)  any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is 
intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause . . . 
death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of 
intimidating a population, or compelling a government or 
 
24. See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-8, at XI–XV (2007) [hereinafter SEN. T. 
DOC. 110-8], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-
110tdoc8/pdf/CDOC-110tdoc8.pdf (summarizing the new offenses 
created by the 2005 SUA Protocol concerning safety of maritime 
navigation and fixed platforms on the continental shelf).  
25. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(d) (defining “BCN” as 
biological, chemical and nuclear).  
26. Id. art. 4(5).  
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an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act; or 
(ii)  any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as 
defined in article 1; or 
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or 
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for 
the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a 
nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity 
not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive 
safeguards agreement; or 
(iv)  any equipment, materials or software or related technology 
that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or 
delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it will 
be used for such purpose.27 
These nonproliferation offenses make significant advances to 
counterterrorism efforts by filling a gap in the existing international 
treaty framework. The 2005 SUA Protocol requires criminalization of 
certain transports of nuclear-related items associated with nuclear 
weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and thus it provides a 
complementary law enforcement element to the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. The revised Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv) of the 1988 
SUA Convention pursuant to the 2005 SUA Protocol goes beyond the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons28 (NPT), as it 
requires the criminalization of the transport of equipment, materials, 
or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the 
design or manufacture of delivery systems for nuclear weapons (other 
than those of NPT nuclear-weapon state parties). The 
nonproliferation offenses further the objectives of, and are 
complementary with, the nonproliferation obligations set forth in 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, adopted in 2004 
and 2006 respectively.29 
 
27. Id. 
28. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into 
force Mar. 5, 1970) (in which states undertake not to transfer nuclear 
weapons, but such conduct is not criminalized). All participants in the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct have either acceded or ratified this treaty. See 
Status of the Treaty - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
29. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); S.C. 
Res. 1673, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006). 
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Under the 2005 SUA Protocol, Article 3bis(2) of the 1988 SUA 
Convention constitutes a nonproliferation “savings clause” by 
specifying that nuclear transport activities remain permissible under 
the 1988 SUA Convention in certain circumstances, notwithstanding 
the wording of the offenses in article 3bis(1)(b).30 Article 3bis(2) states 
that transporting an item or material covered by Article 
3bis(1)(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device, Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv), will not be an offense 
within the meaning of the 1988 SUA Convention if the item or 
material in question is transported to or from the territory of, or is 
otherwise transported under the control of a state party to the NPT. 
This is true where:  
(a)  the resulting transfer or receipt, including internal to a 
State, of the item or material is not contrary to such State 
Party’s obligations under the [NPT] and,  
(b)  if the item or material is intended for the delivery system 
of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a 
State Party to the [NPT], the holding of such weapon or 
device is not contrary to that State Party’s obligations 
under that Treaty.31 
This nonproliferation savings clause in the revised Article 3bis(2) 
of the 1988 SUA Convention, coupled with the general provision in 
Article 2bis(3) declaring that the 1988 SUA Convention shall not 
affect the rights and obligations of state parties under the NPT, 
ensures that the 1988 SUA Convention is consistent with the rights 
and obligations of the state parties to the NPT (except to the extent 
that the 1988 SUA Convention goes beyond the NPT with respect to 
nuclear weapon delivery systems). As provided in Article 3bis(2) of 
the 1988 SUA Convention, the treaty would not require 
criminalization of the transport to or from the territory of, or under 
the control of, an NPT state party of source or special fissionable 
material. The same is true of equipment or material specifically 
designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special 
fissionable material, as long as the resulting transfer or receipt of such 
items or materials is not contrary to the NPT obligations of the NPT 
state party. This is the case even when a non-NPT party is on the 
“other end” of the transport to or from (or under the control of) the 
NPT state party.32 
 
30. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(5). 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
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3.  Transport of terrorist fugitives 
Article 4(6) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3ter to the 
1988 SUA Convention. Article 3ter makes it an offense for a person to 
unlawfully and intentionally transport another person on board a ship 
with knowledge that the person has committed an act that constitutes 
an offense under Article 3, 3bis or 3quater, or an offense set forth in 
one of the treaties listed in the Annex to the 1988 SUA Convention. 
Furthermore, it is an offense to assist that person in evading criminal 
prosecution.33 The Annex is added to the 1988 SUA Convention by 
Article 7 of the 2005 SUA Protocol.34 The inclusion of such an Annex 
mirrors the approach to the Terrorist Financing Convention.35 
Although accessory provisions in the existing counterterrorism 
conventions and protocols may criminalize aiding and abetting a 
fugitive to flee during the course of a crime, this provision would 
criminalize assisting a fugitive to avoid apprehension after the crime 
has been completed. 
4.  Accessory offenses 
Article 3quater provides a comprehensive framework creating 
criminal liability for accessory offenses. This was added to the 1988 
SUA Convention by Article 4(7) of the 2005 SUA Protocol.36 
Subparagraph (a) of Article 3quater makes it an offense to kill or 
injure any person in connection with any offense under Articles 3(1), 
3bis, or 3ter of the Convention. Subparagraph (b) of Article 3quater 
makes it an offense to attempt to commit an offense under 
Articles 3(1), 3bis(1)(a)(i)–(iii), or 3quater(a) of the 1988 SUA 
Convention. Subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Article 3quater make it an 
offense to participate as an accomplice or to organize or direct others 
in connection with any offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 
3quater(a) or (b). Finally, subparagraph (e) of Article 3quater makes 
it an offense to contribute to the commission of one or more offenses 
under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater(a) or (b) by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose.37 These accessory offenses are 
substantially the same as those provided for by the Terrorist 
 
33. Id. art. 4(6).  
34. Id. art. 4(7).  
35. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229 
(entered into force Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing 
Convention]. This treaty includes all participants in the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct except Eritrea and Somalia (although Somalia has signed it). 
See infra Table 2. 
36. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(7).  
37. Id.  
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Bombings Convention38 and the Terrorism Financing Convention.39 
They strengthen the ability of the international community to 
investigate, prosecute, and extradite those who conspire or otherwise 
contribute to the commission of offenses under the 1988 SUA 
Convention. 
Thus, the SUA Conventions and the related treaties on 
nonproliferation and terrorism work in concert to provide an extensive 
legal regime where all manner of violent acts that could occur through 
maritime piracy are addressed. 
III. Requirement for Transnational Element 
For the Hostage-Taking Convention to apply, the offense must 
have some transnational character. In particular, the Hostage-Taking 
Convention provides that it does not apply if the offense is committed 
within a single state, or if the hostage and alleged offender are 
nationals of that state and the alleged offender is found in the 
territory of that state.40 
For the SUA Conventions to apply to a particular situation, the 
offense must have a different transnational character. Offenses under 
the 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol apply “if the 
ship is navigating of is scheduled to navigate into, through or from 
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, 
or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.”41 
Nevertheless, if the 1988 SUA Convention does not apply pursuant to 
Article 4(1), it applies “when the offender . . . is found in the territory 
of a State Party other than the State referred to in” Article 4(1).42 
Thus, the 1988 SUA Convention applies where a covered offense 
occurs in the territorial sea of a state or if the offender is found in the 
territory of another state party. 
Accordingly, offenses under these conventions are not limited to 
the high seas and exclusive economic zone as in the case of piracy. 
 
38. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
opened for signature Jan. 12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284 (entered into 
force May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention]. All 
participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except Eritrea, Jordan, 
Oman, and Somalia are parties. See infra Table 2.  
39. See Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 38, art. 2, 2149 U.N.T.S. 
at 285–86; Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 35, art. 2, 2178 
U.N.T.S. at 230–31. 
40. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210. 
41. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225. 
42. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(2), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 226; 
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(2).  
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Rather, in defined circumstances, they may also occur in the 
territorial sea.  
IV.  Persons Who Can Commit Hostage-Taking or SUA 
Offenses 
There are three categories of persons who can commit the offense 
of hostage-taking. The first category is comprised of those that 
actually commit an act of hostage-taking. The second includes those 
that attempt to commit an act of hostage-taking. Finally, the third 
category comprises those that participate as an accomplice of anyone 
who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking.43 
As opposed to the Hostage-Taking Convention, there are six 
categories of persons who can commit a SUA offense under the 2005 
SUA Protocol. The six categories include those that actually commit 
a SUA offense; those that attempt to commit a SUA offense; those 
that participate as an accomplice of anyone who commits a SUA 
offense; those who organize or direct others to commit a SUA offense; 
those who unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill a person in 
connection with the commission of a SUA offense; and those who 
contribute to the commission of one or more SUA offenses by a group 
of persons’ actions with a common purpose. For this final category, 
the action must be intentional, and it must occur either with the aim 
of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, 
where the activity or purpose involves the commission of a SUA 
offense, or the knowledge of the group’s intention to commit a SUA 
offense.44  
Under all three major treaties, the scope of the offenses can 
include piratical acts committed at sea. 
V.  INNOCENT PERSONS45 
The 2005 SUA Protocol was drafted to prevent innocent seafarers 
from subjection to criminal prosecution under the 1988 SUA 
Convention simply for being on board a vessel that was engaged in 
illegal actions. This is the case even where the seafarer had mere 
knowledge of the criminal activity. 
The offenses enumerated in Article 3bis(1)(b)46 apply by virtue of 
the definition of “transport” in Article 2 of the 2005 SUA Protocol to 
 
43. Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2), 1316 U.N.T.S. at 
207.  
44. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4 (amending or creating 
Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, 3quater).  
45. SEN. T. DOC. 110-8, supra note 24, at XVI–XVII (describing how the 
2005 SUA Protocol protects innocent seafarers from criminal 
prosecution). 
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those persons who initiate, arrange, or exercise effective control, 
including decision-making authority, over the movement of a person 
or item.47 This definition would exclude from criminal liability 
seafarers and employees on shore, except in those rare cases where 
they are actively engaged in the criminal activity. 
The individual offenses added by the 2005 SUA Protocol contain 
subjective elements that would exclude innocent carriers and seafarers 
from their reach. For example, under the provision that covers certain 
dual use items (Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv)), the transporter must have the 
intention that the dual use item will be used in the design, 
manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon.48 In most situations, a 
seafarer, for example, would not have the requisite general knowledge 
and intent, let alone the additional specific intent required under this 
provision. When containers are ordinarily sealed and loaded at port, a 
seafarer likely would not know what is in the containers. In order for 
a seafarer to be held criminally liable, a prosecuting state must prove 
three elements. First, the state must prove that the seafarer knew 
what the item was. Second the state must prove that the seafarer 
intentionally initiated, arranged, or exercised effective control, 
including decision-making authority, over the movement of the item 
by, for example, smuggling the item on board or placing the item in a 
container to be loaded on the ship. Finally, the prosecuting state must 
prove that the seafarer intended for the item to be used in the design, 
manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon.49 
VI.  Ship Boarding Under the 2005 SUA Protocol 
The 2005 SUA Protocol contains a comprehensive provision on 
the procedures for obtaining flag state consent to board ships seaward 
of the territorial sea suspected of committing offenses. The 2005 SUA 
Protocol also includes a provision outlining the conduct of such 
boardings.50 
Article 8(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 8bis to the 
1988 SUA Convention.51 Article 8bis creates a ship boarding regime 
by establishing a comprehensive set of procedures and protections 
designed to facilitate the boarding of a vessel suspected of being 
 
46. See supra Section II.C.2.  
47. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2. 
48. Id. art. 4(5). 
49. See id. arts. 2, 4(5).  
50. See SEN. T. DOC. 110-8, supra note 24, at XVII–XXIV (summarizing 
Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA Protocol). 
51. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).  
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involved in an offense under the 1988 SUA Convention.52 The 
boarding procedures do not change existing international maritime 
law, nor do they infringe upon the traditional principle of freedom of 
navigation. Instead, the procedures eliminate the need to negotiate 
time-consuming ad hoc boarding arrangements when facing the 
immediacy of ongoing criminal activity.  
The first three paragraphs of Article 8bis set forth general 
parameters for the ship boarding regime. State parties must cooperate 
to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress offenses under 
the 1988 SUA Convention, in conformity with international law, and 
to respond to requests under the boarding regime as expeditiously as 
possible.53 This provision is derived from Article 17(1) of the 1988 
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (“1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug 
Convention”),54 in addition to Article 7 of the Protocol Against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (“Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol”), supplementing the U.N. Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.55 
Each request should, if possible, contain the name of the 
suspected ship, the ship’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
identification number, the port of registry, the ports of origin and 
destination, and any other relevant information.56 In addition, each 
state party must take into account the dangers and difficulties 
involved in boarding a ship at sea and searching its cargo. Each state 
party must consider whether other appropriate measures agreed 
between the states concerned could be more safely taken in the next 
port of call or elsewhere.57 
 
52. Id.  
53. Id.  
54. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 
U.N.T.S. 165 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990) [hereinafter 1988 Vienna 
Narcotic Drug Convention]. All participants in the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct except Somalia are party to this Convention. See infra 
Table 2. 
55. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507 
(entered into force Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol]. All participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except 
Comoros, Eritrea, Jordan, Maldives, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen 
are party to this Protocol. See infra Table 2. 
56. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding these requirements in 
Article 8bis(2)).  
57. Id. art. 8 (including these factors in Article 8bis(3)).  
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Pursuant to paragraph 4 of article 8bis, if a state party has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 
3ter, or 3quater of the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being, or is 
about to be committed involving a ship flying its flag, the state party 
may request the assistance of other state parties in preventing or 
suppressing that offense. The requested state parties shall use their 
best endeavors to render such assistance within the means available to 
them.58 This provision is derived from Article 17(2) of the 1988 
Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(1) of the Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol. This provision does not obligate a party to board 
or take law enforcement actions on foreign-flagged ships, except to the 
extent it is required to use best endeavors to render assistance within 
the means available to it upon request of a flag state to assist in 
prevention or suppression of an offense specified under the 1988 SUA 
Convention.59 The absence of a reference in paragraph 4 to “marks of 
registry” (both “flying its flag” and “displaying marks of registry” are 
used in paragraph 5) is of no consequence because each refers to 
indicia of the nationality of the vessel permissible. This is reflected in 
Articles 5 and 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,60 and 
Articles 91 and 92 of the UNCLOS.61  
Paragraph 5 of Article 8bis sets forth the procedures for ship 
boarding. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a 
state party (“the Requesting Party”) encounter a ship flying the flag 
or displaying the marks of registry of another state party (“the First 
Party”) located seaward of any state’s territorial sea, and the 
requesting party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a 
person on board the ship has been, is, or is about to be involved in 
the commission of an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of 
the 1988 SUA Convention, and the requesting party desires to board, 
it shall take the following steps. In this situation, law enforcement 
must request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, that the First 
Party confirm the claim of nationality. If nationality is confirmed, the 
Requesting Party shall ask the First Party (also called “the flag 
state”) for authorization to take appropriate measures. This may 
 
58. Id. art. 8 (adding this provision in Article 8bis(4)).  
59. 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17, 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 197; Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 8(1), 
2241 U.N.T.S. at 510. 
60. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 
U.S.T 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962), 
[hereinafter High Seas Convention]. Parties to this treaty include only 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa from the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct. 
61. UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 91, 92, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433; see also 
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding similar provisions in 
Article 8bis(5)(a),(b), and (d)). 
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include stopping, boarding, and searching the ship, its cargo and 
persons on board, as well as questioning the persons on board.62 
The flag state may, pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(c), authorize the 
Requesting Party to board and take appropriate measures described 
in subparagraph (b), conduct the boarding and search with its own 
law enforcement or other officials, conduct the boarding and search 
together with the requesting party, or decline to authorize a boarding 
and search.63 Article 8bis(5)(c) expands on the provisions of Article 
17(4) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(2) 
of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Nothing in Article 8bis(5) requires 
the flag state to provide any such authorization. Moreover, 
Article 8bis(5)(c) makes clear that the Requesting Party may not take 
any measures set forth above without the express authorization of the 
flag state. A flag state may also impose certain restrictions on the 
Requesting Party’s board and search measures, in accordance with 
Article 8bis(7), discussed in greater detail below. 
A state party may provide advance consent to board ships flying 
its flag or displaying its mark of registry pursuant to subparagraphs 
(d) or (e) of Article 8bis(5) by notification to the IMO 
Secretary-General.64 A notification pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(d) 
would grant the Requesting Party authorization to board and search 
a ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on 
board in order to locate and examine documentation of its nationality 
and determine if an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of 
the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed, if there is no response from that state party, within four 
hours of acknowledgement of its receipt of a request to confirm 
nationality.65 Notification pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(e) would provide 
general advance consent for other state parties to board and search 
such ships, their cargo, and persons on board, and to question the 
persons on board in order to determine if an offense under Articles 3, 
3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being, 
or is about to be committed. These optional notifications may be 
withdrawn at any time.66 Advance consent pursuant to either 
subparagraph (d) or (e) is not authorization for detention of the 
vessel, cargo, or persons on board or any other enforcement action.67  
 
62. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding these provisions to 
Article 8bis(5)(a) and (b)).  
63. Id. (adding the authorization to Article 8bis(5)(c)). 
64. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2) (adding these provisions to 
Article 8bis(5)(d) and (e)). 
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
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Under paragraph 6 of Article 8bis, when the requesting Party 
boards and finds evidence of the conduct described in Articles 3, 3bis, 
3ter or 3quater, the flag state may authorize the Requesting Party to 
detain the ship, cargo, and persons on board, pending receipt of 
disposition instructions from the flag state. The Requesting Party 
must in all cases promptly inform the flag state of the results of a 
boarding, search, and detention conducted pursuant to Article 8bis, 
including discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that is not subject to 
the 1988 SUA Convention.68 
Paragraph 7 of Article 8bis permits a flag state to subject its 
authorization under paragraphs 5 or 6 to conditions, including 
obtaining additional information from the Requesting Party and 
relating to responsibility for and the extent of measures to be taken. 
This provision builds on the text of Article 17(6) of the 1988 Vienna 
Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(5) of the Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol. Paragraph 7 also prohibits the Requesting State from taking 
any measures without the express authorization of the flag state, 
except when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of 
persons or when otherwise derived from bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.69 
Paragraph 8 of Article 8bis reaffirms explicitly that, for all 
boardings under Article 8bis, the flag state retains the right to 
exercise jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo, or other items and 
persons on board, including seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution. 
However, the flag state may, subject to its constitution and laws, 
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by another state party that has 
jurisdiction under Article 6 of the 1988 SUA Convention.70 
Paragraph 9 of Article 8bis sets forth overarching principles for 
the use of force by officials acting under the ship boarding regime. It 
directs state parties to avoid the use of force “except when necessary 
to ensure the safety of its officials and persons on board, or where the 
officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions.”71 
Paragraph 9 also specifies that any such use of force “shall not exceed 
the minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in the 
circumstances.”72 The language of Article 8bis(9) is drawn from 
Article 22(1)(f) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.73 As such, 
this use of force provision is consistent with current practice on the 
use of force in international law. 
Paragraph 10 of Article 8bis establishes a number of safeguard 
provisions to protect seafarers and carriers during the conduct of ship 
boardings. First, subparagraph (a) sets forth a series of safeguards 
that a state party taking measures against a ship must respect. These 
measures include taking due account of the need not to endanger the 
safety of life at sea; treating all persons in a manner that preserves 
their human dignity and complies with applicable provisions of 
international law; ensuring that a boarding and search is conducted in 
accordance with applicable international law; taking due account of 
the safety and security of the ship and cargo; taking due account of 
the need not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag 
state; ensuring, within available means, that any measure taken with 
regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound; ensuring that 
any person on board against whom proceedings may be commenced in 
connection with offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention is 
guaranteed fair treatment, regardless of location; ensuring that the 
master of a ship is advised of its intention to board, and is, or has 
been, afforded the opportunity to contact the ship’s owner and the 
flag state at the earliest opportunity; and taking reasonable efforts to 
avoid undue detention or delay of the ship.74 These safeguards build 
on those contained in Article 17(5) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug 
Convention and Article 9 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.75 
Article 8bis(10)(b) establishes a framework for liability and 
recourse arising from any damage, harm, or loss attributable to state 
 
73. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 
2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001). Of the participants 
in the Djibouti Code of Conduct, France, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles and South Africa are party. Compare 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/djibouti-code-conduct 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014), with Status of Treaties, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-7&chapter=21&lang=en.  
74. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).  
75. 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(5), 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 197 (“Parties concerned shall take due account of the need 
not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel and 
the cargo or to prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag 
State or any other interested state”); Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra 
note 55, art. 9, 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511 (containing a number of safeguard 
clauses, including those related to the safety of the vessel and persons on 
board).  
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parties taking measures under Article 8bis. It clarifies that 
authorization to board by a flag state shall not per se give rise to its 
liability. Liability for damage, harm, or loss as a result of ship 
boarding activities arises under two circumstances. The first 
circumstance occurs when the grounds for ship boarding measures 
prove to be unfounded, provided that the ship has not committed any 
act justifying the measures taken. The second circumstance takes 
place when such measures are unlawful or unreasonable in light of the 
available information to implement the provisions of Article 8bis.76 
State parties are obligated to “provide effective recourse in respect of 
such damage, harm or loss.”77 This provision does not require a state 
party to provide a specific remedy, forum, or venue, and it does not 
require any form of binding dispute resolution. Accordingly, the 
manner of “effective recourse” remains at the discretion of each state 
party. Article 8bis(10)(b) of the 1988 SUA Convention is consistent 
with the claims provisions of existing relevant international treaties, 
including Article 22(3) of the High Seas Convention and Article 9(2) 
of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.78  
Article 8bis(10)(c) requires any state party that takes measures 
against a ship in accordance with the 1988 SUA Convention to take 
due account of the need not to interfere with the rights and 
obligations and exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states in accordance 
with the international law of the sea and the authority of flag states 
to exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and 
social matters involving the ship.79 This provision builds upon Article 
17(11) of the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention, Article 94(1) of 
UNCLOS, and Article 9(3) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.80 
 
76. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2). 
77. Id.  
78. High Seas Convention, supra note 60, art. 22(3), 450 U.N.T.S. at 94 (“If 
the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship 
boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be 
compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.”); 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(2), 2241 U.N.T.S. at 
511 (“Where the grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 of 
this Protocol prove to be unfounded, the vessel shall be compensated for 
any loss or damage that may have been sustained, provided that the 
vessel has not committed any act justifying the measures taken.”).  
79. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).  
80. 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(11), 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating that measures should not affect the rights and 
obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states); UNCLOS, 
supra note 12, art. 94(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 434 (“Every State shall 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”); Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(3), 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Global Conventions on Maritime Crimes Involving Piratical Acts 
113 
Subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 8bis(10) designate who may 
conduct ship boardings consistent with the 1988 SUA Convention. 
Article 8bis(10)(d) requires that any ship boarding measure must be 
carried out by law enforcement or other authorized officials from 
warships or military aircraft, or from other ships or aircraft clearly 
marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to that effect. Additionally, notwithstanding Articles 2 and 
2bis of the 1988 SUA Convention, the provisions of Article 8bis will 
apply.81 This provision reflects the accepted international law rule as 
set out in Article 17(10) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug 
Convention, Article 9(4) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, 
Articles 21 and 23(4) of the High Seas Convention, and Articles 107 
and 111(5) of UNCLOS.82 Article 8bis(10)(e) defines “law enforcement 
or other authorized officials” as “uniformed or otherwise clearly 
identifiable members of law enforcement or other government 
authorities duly authorized by their government.”83 For the purposes 
of ship boarding under the 1988 SUA Convention, these officials must 
provide appropriate government-issued identification documents for 
examination by the master of the ship upon boarding. 
The ship boarding provisions under the 1988 SUA Convention do 
not apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any state party 
in accordance with international law, seaward of any state’s territorial 
sea. Paragraph 11 of Article 8bis confirms this understanding of the 
1988 SUA Convention’s applicability.84 Other lawful ship boarding 
measures include, but are not limited to, the right of approach and 
visit; belligerent rights under the law of war; self-defense; the 
enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolutions; actions taken 
pursuant to specific bilateral or multilateral instruments such as 
counter-narcotics agreements; the rendering of assistance to persons, 
ships, and property in peril; authorization from the flag state to take 
action; or the historic role of the armed forces in law enforcement 
activities on the high seas.85 Article 8bis would not affect these rights. 
 
(indicating that measures cannot interfere with the exercise of 
jurisdiction of the coastal or flag state). 
81. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).  
82. 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(10), 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating that action must be carried out by warships, 
military aircraft, or other vessels marked as being in government 
service); Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(4), 2241 
U.N.T.S. at 511 (same); High Seas Convention, supra note 60, arts. 21, 
23(4), 450 U.N.T.S. at 92, 94 (same); UNCLOS, supra note 12, 
arts. 107, 111(5), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437, 439 (same).  
83. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).  
84. Id.  
85. J. Ashley Roach, Global Conventions on Piracy, Ship Hijacking, Hostage 
Taking and Maritime Terrorism: Prospects for Cooperation, in PIRACY 
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Paragraph 12 of Article 8bis encourages states parties to develop 
standard operating procedures for joint operations, and recommends 
consultation, as appropriate, with other state parties with a view to 
harmonizing such standard operating procedures. Paragraph 13 allows 
state parties to conclude agreements or arrangements between 
themselves to facilitate law enforcement operations carried out 
pursuant to Article 8bis. This provision is adapted from Article 17(9) 
of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 17 of the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol.86 Paragraph 14 requires each state party 
to take appropriate measures to ensure that law enforcement or other 
authorized officials acting on its behalf are empowered to conduct ship 
boarding activities and take other appropriate measures pursuant to 
Article 8bis.87 
Finally, paragraph 15 of Article 8bis directs each state party to 
designate the appropriate authority or authorities to receive and 
respond to requests for assistance, confirmation of nationality, and 
authorization to take appropriate measures. This designation, 
including contact information of the authority or authorities, must be 
notified to the IMO Secretary-General within one month of becoming 
a party. The IMO Secretary-General will inform all other state parties 
within one month of such designation. Under paragraph 15 of 
Article 8bis, each state party is responsible for providing prompt 
notice through the IMO Secretary-General of any changes in the 
designation or contact information.88 This provision is adapted from 
Article 17(7) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and 
Article 8(6) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.89  
 
AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES IN ASEAN 55 (Robert C. 
Beckman & J. Ashley Roach eds., 2012). 
86. 1998 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(9), 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 198.  
87. Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 17, 2241 U.N.T.S. at 
515. 
88. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2). Only Latvia is reported by 
the IMO to have made the notification required by Article 8bis. IMO, 
supra note 9, at 431. 
89. 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(7), 1582 
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating “at the time of becoming a Party to this 
Convention, each Party shall designate an authority or, when necessary, 
authorities to receive and respond to such requests. Such designation 
shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other Parties 
within one month of the designation.”); Migrant Smuggling Protocol, 
supra note 55, art. 8(6), 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511 (stating “[e]ach State 
Party shall designate an authority or, where necessary, authorities to 
receive and respond to requests for assistance, for confirmation of 
registry or of the right of a vessel to fly its flag and for authorization to 
take appropriate measures. Such designation shall be notified through 
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Article 9 of the 2005 SUA Protocol amends Article 10(2) of the 
1988 SUA Convention by adding specific reference to international 
law including international human rights law. This amendment is 
intended to further enhance the safeguards for seafarers. As revised, 
Article 10(2) of the Convention provides that any person who is taken 
into custody or otherwise subject to proceedings under the 1988 SUA 
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including all rights 
and guarantees under the law of the state in which that person is 
present, as well as “applicable provisions of international law, 
including international human rights law.”90 This additional text 
already appears in Article 17 of the Terrorism Financing Convention 
and in Article 14 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention.91 
VII. Arrest and Prosecution 
There is no authority under the 1988 SUA or Hostage-Taking 
Conventions to board ships on high seas and seize offenders without 
flag state consent.92 These conventions also apply when the alleged 
offenders are present in the territory or territorial sea of a state 
party.93 Once alleged offenders are present in the territory of a state 
party, the state party is under an obligation to take the offenders into 
custody, and to prosecute them or extradite them to their home 
country.94 
Under the 1988 SUA Convention, the master of a ship may 
deliver to any other state party “any person who he has reasonable 
grounds to believe has committed [a SUA offense].”95 For example, 
 
the Secretary-General to all other States Parties within one month of 
the designation.”).  
90. 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 9.  
91. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 35, art. 17, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
197 at 237 (stating that any person taken into custody under the 
convention shall be treated fairly in accordance with international law 
and international human rights law); Terrorist Bombings Convention, 
supra note 38, art. 14, 2149 U.N.T.S. at 290 (same).  
92. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224; 
see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 
210 (“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the 
violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State 
in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.”).  
93. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see 
Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1)(a), 1316 U.N.T.S. at 
207. 
94. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 10(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 229; 
see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(1), 1316 U.N.T.S. 
at 208.  
95. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 8(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 228. 
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since Kenya is a party to the 1988 SUA Convention and the 
Hostage-Taking Convention, warships that seize pirates in the 
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Somalia can 
deliver them to Kenya for prosecution and trial. The Hostage-Taking 
Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention also have provisions which 
make it possible to arrest and prosecute accomplices and leaders on 
land. The conventions provide that a person commits an offense if 
they abet the commission of any offense or if they are an accomplice 
of a person who commits an offense. Relevant accomplice provisions 
were discussed earlier in this article. 
VIII. EXTRADITION96 
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention 
both contain similar provisions on extradition. While the 2005 SUA 
Protocol brings the extradition provisions of the 1988 SUA 
Convention in line with the modern terrorism conventions, the 
extradition provisions of the Hostage-Taking Convention have not yet 
been updated. 
Article (10)(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds a new provision to 
the 1988 SUA Convention, Article 11bis, which states that none of 
the offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention shall be regarded, for 
the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political 
offense.97 Thus, a state may not refuse a request for extradition or 
mutual legal assistance solely by claiming a political offense. 
Similarly, a state cannot base its refusal on the grounds that the 
offense was connected with a political offense, or the offense was 
inspired by political motives. Article 11bis thus usefully restricts a 
state’s ability to utilize the political offense exception in response to 
extradition requests pursuant to the 1988 SUA Convention. Like 
similar provisions in Article 14 of the Terrorism Financing 
Convention and Article 11 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, 
Article 11bis builds on this trend by making the restriction on the 
invocation of the political offense exception for requests based on 
offenses under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater a matter of general 
application. This now occurs in place of a dependence on the terms of 
individual bilateral law enforcement treaties between the states 
parties.98  
Article 10(3) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 11ter to the 
1988 SUA Convention, which provides that the 1988 SUA Convention 
 
96. The summary of these provisions on extradition is taken from Senate 
Treaty Document 110-8. SEN. T. DOC. 110-8 supra note 24, at XXIV–
XXV. 
97. Id. at XXIV.  
98. Id.  
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does not impose an obligation to extradite or afford mutual legal 
assistance if the requested state party has substantial grounds for 
believing that such a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance 
has been made for a group of potential purposes. These purposes 
include prosecuting and punishing a person on account of that 
person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or 
gender. Further, the 1988 SUA Convention does not improve on 
obligations to extradite or afford mutual legal assistance if compliance 
with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for 
any of the same reasons outlined above.99 This Article is similar to 
provisions already included in a number of existing U.N. 
counterterrorism treaties, including Article 12 of the Terrorist 
Bombings Convention and Article 15 of the Terrorism Financing 
Convention.100 Aug 
IX.  MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE101 
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention 
both contain similar provisions on mutual legal assistance. While the 
2005 SUA Protocol brings the mutual legal assistance provisions of 
the 1988 SUA Convention in line with the modern terrorism 
conventions, the mutual legal assistance provisions of the 
Hostage-Taking Convention have not yet been updated. 
Article 11(1) of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming changes 
to Article 12(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention, which maintains state 
parties’ obligations to afford one another assistance in connection with 
criminal proceedings brought for offenses under the 1988 SUA 
Convention. The amended provision updates the terms of assistance 
to encompass the new categories of offenses under the 1988 SUA 
Convention, as amended by the 2005 SUA Protocol, but it does not 
change the substantive language describing the degree of assistance 
required.102  
Article 11(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol does, however, establish a 
system to enhance the assistance that state parties may provide to 
each other in connection with offenses under the 1988 SUA 
Convention. It provides for a new article, Article 12bis, to govern the 
transfer of individuals in the custody of one state party to provide 
 
99. Id. at XXIV–XXV. 
100. Id. at XXV.  
101. The summary of these provisions on mutual legal assistance is taken 
from Senate Treaty Document 110-8. SEN. T. DOC. 110-8 supra note 24, 
at XXV–XXVI. 
102. Id. at XXV.  
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assistance to another state party in connection with an investigation 
or prosecution for offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention.103 
Paragraph 1 of Article 12bis provides that a person who is being 
detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one state party 
whose presence in another state party is requested for identification, 
testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for 
the investigation or prosecution of offenses set forth in Articles 3, 3bis, 
3ter, and 3quater may be transferred, if two conditions are met. First, 
the person in custody must freely give informed consent to be 
transferred. Second, the competent authorities of both states must 
agree upon the transfer, subject to such conditions as those states 
may deem appropriate.104 Similar provisions for the temporary transfer 
of persons in custody of one state party to another state party are 
included in Article 16 of the Terrorism Financing Convention, 
Article 13 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and numerous 
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties.105 
Paragraph 2 of Article 12bis details certain rights and obligations 
of a state to which a person is transferred pursuant to Article 12bis. 
Under subparagraph (a), the state to which the person is transferred 
maintains the authority and obligation to keep the transferred person 
in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the state from 
which the person was transferred. Next, subparagraph (b) requires the 
state to which the person is transferred to implement without delay 
its obligation to return the person to the custody of the state from 
which the person was transferred as agreed in advance, or as 
otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both states. 
Additionally, subparagraph (c) states that return of a person 
transferred under Article 12bis shall not require initiation of 
extradition proceedings. Finally, subparagraph (d) requires that the 
person transferred receive credit for service of the sentence being 
served in the state from which the person was transferred for time 
spent in the custody of the state to which the person was 
transferred.106 
Paragraph 3 of Article 12bis establishes a default rule that a 
person transferred pursuant to Article 12bis, whatever that person’s 
nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, or subjected to any 
other restriction of personal liberty in the territory of the state to 
which that person is transferred for acts or convictions prior to that 
person’s departure from the territory of the transferring state. 
However, the state party from which the person was transferred 
 
103. Id.  
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. Id. at XXV–XXVI.  
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pursuant to Article 12bis may agree otherwise, in which case this 
default rule will not impair the agreement between the state from 
which the person is transferred and the state to which the person is 
transferred.107 
Article 12 of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming changes to 
Article 13 of the 1988 SUA Convention to incorporate references to 
the new offenses. As amended, Article 13 provides that state parties 
shall cooperate in the prevention of offenses set forth in Articles 3, 
3bis, 3ter, and 3quater by taking all practicable measures to prevent 
preparation in their respective territories for the commission of such 
offenses and by exchanging information and coordinating measures to 
prevent the commission of such offenses. Article 13 also provides that 
any state party shall be bound to exercise all possible efforts to avoid 
undue delay or detention of a ship, its passengers, crew, or cargo 
when the passage of that ship has been delayed or interrupted due to 
the commission of an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater.108 
Articles 13 and 14 of the 2005 SUA Protocol make conforming 
amendments to Article 14 and Article 15, paragraph 3, of the 1988 
SUA Convention to make those provisions consistent with the new 
articles and terminology added to the 1988 SUA Convention by the 
2005 SUA Protocol. These provisions govern information sharing 
under the 1988 SUA Convention with respect to any offense or 
suspected offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention.109 
X.  How These Conventions Deal with Piracy 
Hijackings off Somalia are offenses under the Hostage-Taking 
Convention because the pirates intend to hold the crew hostage until 
ransom is paid. The pirates clearly commit the offense of 
hostage-taking when they board (or attempt to board) the ship, 
detain the crew, and finally release the crew after ransom is demanded 
and paid. Again, in the context of Somali piracy, offenders of hostage-
taking include the pirates who board and detain a ship, and also those 
pirates who attempt to stop a ship but fail (perhaps due to the 
successful employment of Best Management Practices).110 In addition, 
those who assist the pirates, including the “mother ship” operators 
and providers of logistics support ashore, also commit the offense of 
hostage-taking as aiders and abettors. 
 
107. Id. at XXVI.  
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
110. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST 
SOMALI BASED PIRACY 1 (2011), available at http://www.mschoa.org/ 
docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5_2011.pdf (stating the 
definition of piracy for the purposes of the Best Management Practices).  
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Hijackings of vessels off Somalia are also offenses under the 1988 
SUA Convention because the seizure of a ship by force is a SUA 
offense. Somali pirates boarding a ship commit the offense described 
in Article 3(1)(a) with this violent and intentional action.111 As with 
hostage-taking, pirates commit a SUA offense even if they fail to 
exercise control over a ship, and those who abet the offense or are 
accomplices also commit a SUA offense.  
These acts can be offenses under the Hostage Taking and 1988 
SUA Convention even if they took place in the territorial sea of 
another state.112 This is in contrast to the territorial limitations of the 
crime of piracy, which can only occur on the high seas, EEZ, or 
outside the jurisdiction of any state.113 Moreover, the three 
conventions not only encompass a broad scope of offenses that can 
include piracy, but they also contain provisions that have particular 
relevance to the crime of piracy. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council 
reiterated this point in Resolutions 1846 and 2020. It recognized that 
many countries afflicted with piracy do not have adequate domestic 
legislation that deals specifically with piracy, and they have even less 
guidance on how to treat and prosecute pirates once they are 
captured. In light of this absence, the Security Council reiterates first 
that the 1988 SUA Convention can help fill this void by, inter alia, 
creating offenses and establishing jurisdiction.114 Resolution 2020 also 
incorporates the Hostage-Taking Convention by condemning the 
offenses included therein. Thus, the international community strongly 
endorses ratification of these treaties, or domestic legislation 
containing similar language, in order to effectively combat maritime 
piracy.115 
XI.  Conclusion 
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention 
collectively fill many of the limitations in the UNCLOS articles on 
piracy. Further, the 2005 SUA Protocol makes significant 
improvements to its predecessor. Used together, these instruments 
complement each other in the context of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. As seafarers from all countries, and the ships of all countries, are 
 
111. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224. 
112. Id. art. 4(1); see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(1), 
1316 U.N.T.S. at 207 (providing that a state “in the territory of which 
the hostage is held by the offender shall take all measures it considers 
appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage”).  
113. UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 58(2), 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 419, 436. 
114. See S.C. Res. 1846, para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); 
S.C. Res. 2020, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
115. See S.C. Res. 2020, supra note 114, pmbl. 
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vulnerable to piracy and armed robbery at sea, to the extent that 
they have not yet done so, all countries should promptly ratify and 
implement each of the three primary treaties. 
If all the states in this and other regions ratified and effectively 
implemented the Hostage-Taking Convention, the 1988 SUA 
Convention, and the 2005 SUA Protocol, they would give the 
international community another set of useful tools to combat piracy 
and armed robbery at sea.116 
Table 1 
 
116. The U.N. General Assembly, in its omnibus resolution on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea adopted on December 11, 2012, called upon states 
that have not yet done so to become parties to the 1988 and 2005 SUA 
Conventions and urged “States parties to take appropriate measures to 
ensure the effective implementation of those instruments through the 
adoption of legislation, where appropriate” and to the Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol and “to take appropriate measures to ensure their 
effective implementation.” G.A. Res. 67/78, ¶¶ 107, 114, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/67/78 (Dec. 11, 2012). 
117. Status of High Seas Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XXI-2&chapter=21&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
118. Status of UNCLOS, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/ 
pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapte
r=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
119. IMO, supra note 9, at 430. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, none of 
these states are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol. 
120. Id.  
121. Status of Hostage-Taking Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/UNTC/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
Participants 
in Djibouti 
Code of 
Conduct 
Signed 
Djibouti 
Code of 
Conduct
Party 
to High 
Seas 
Conv.117
Party 
to 
UNCLOS118
Party 
to 1988 
SUA 
Conv.119
Party to 
2005 SUA 
Protocol120
Party 
to 
Hostage 
Taking 
Conv.121 
Comoros 23/11/09 yes yes yes 
Djibouti 29/09/09 yes yes yes 
Egypt 01/10/09 yes yes yes 
Eritrea 26/10/10
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122. The “/s/” indicates the party has only signed the treaty, but has not 
ratified or acceded to it.  
Participants 
in Djibouti 
Code of 
Conduct 
Signed 
Djibouti 
Code of 
Conduct
Party 
to High 
Seas 
Conv. 
Party 
to 
UNCLOS 
Party 
to 1988 
SUA 
Conv. 
Party to 
2005 SUA 
Protocol 
Party 
to 
Hostage 
Taking 
Conv. 
Ethiopia 29/09/09 /s/122 yes yes 
France yes yes yes 
Jordan 20/05/10 yes yes yes 
Kenya 29/09/09 yes yes yes yes 
Madagascar 29/09/09 yes yes yes yes 
Maldives 29/09/09 yes
Mauritius 23/03/10 yes yes yes yes 
Mozambique 06/07/12 yes yes yes 
Oman 29/07/10 yes yes yes 
Saudi 
Arabia 
10/03/10 yes yes yes yes 
Seychelles 29/09/09 yes yes yes 
Somalia 29/09/09 yes
South Africa 15/05/12 yes yes yes yes 
Sudan 01/12/09 yes yes yes 
UAE 18/04/11 /s/ yes yes 
Tanzania 29/09/09 yes yes yes 
Yemen 29/09/09 yes yes yes 
Totals (21) 20 4 18 18 1 18 
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Table 2 
Participants 
in Djibouti 
Code of 
Conduct 
Party to 
1988 
Vienna 
Drug 
Convention
123 
Party to 
2000 
Migrant 
Smuggling 
Protocol124 
Party to 
1997 
Terrorist 
Bombing 
Convention
125 
Party to 
Terrorism 
Financing 
Conv.126 
Party 
to 
TOC127
Party 
to 
CAC128 
Comoros yes
 
yes yes yes yes 
Djibouti yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Egypt yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Eritrea yes  
Ethiopia yes yes yes yes yes yes 
France yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Jordan yes
 
 yes yes yes 
Kenya yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Madagascar yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
123. Status of 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&lang=en (last visited Mar. 
14, 2014).  
124. Status of Migrant Smuggling Protocol, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
b&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
125. Status of Terrorist Bombing Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
126. Status of Terrorism Financing Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).  
127. Status of 2000 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18& 
lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
128. Status of 2003 U.N. Convention against Corruption, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_ 
no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
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Participants 
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Convention
Party to 
2000 
Migrant 
Smuggling 
Protocol 
Party to 
1997 
Terrorist 
Bombing 
Convention
Party to 
Terrorism 
Financing 
Conv. 
Party 
to 
TOC 
Party 
to 
CAC 
Maldives yes
 
yes yes yes yes 
Mauritius yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Mozambique yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Oman yes yes  yes yes yes 
Saudi 
Arabia 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Seychelles yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Somalia  /s/
South Africa yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sudan yes
 
yes yes yes /s/ 
UAE yes
 
yes yes yes yes 
Tanzania yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Yemen yes
 
yes yes yes yes 
Totals (21) 20 13 17 19 19 18 
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